31 Dec 2009
To the Collective Sale Committee and Credo Real Estate:
Dear Sirs/Madams,
I am writing on behalf of owner of Blk 1 of Botanic Gardens View, who has appointed me as representative on the matter of the collective sale of Botanic Gardens View (BGV).
During the Extra-ordinary General Meeting (EGM) dated 23 August 2008, I and others, have raised a number of critical issues that are seen to be highly problematic both in the collective sale process, and in the Collective Sale Agreement (CSA). Since then, an amended CSA had been sent out to all owners dated 18 October 2009. In the letter from the Mr John Lee, Chairman of the Collective Sale Committee (CSC), it was stated that:
"After deliberations and taking into account the various proposals raised by a few owners at the EGM, the Collective Sale Committee (CSC) agreed with the amendments as proposed by Mr. Norman Ho. A set of the amended pages of the CSA is enclosed for your reference."
I note that the amended CSA included several changes made to Clause 4.1.4 (on the matter of the lower reserve price), with minor changes elsewhere. While this appears to indicate that the CSC may have taken into consideration the “various proposals”, upon closer reading of the amended Clause 4.1.4, I am very disappointed that majority of the issues raised on the 23 August 2008 EGM were not addressed. In fact, my reading of Clause 4.1.4 is that the revision serves to tighten a possible loophole to prevent Sellers who withdraws from the CSA because of the lower sale price from seeking legal action against the CSC and other Sellers.
I wish to reiterate the issues that I raised during the 23 August 2008 EGM, and which is still relevant now, on the following points of the apportionment method and the CSA:
Proposed Apportionment Method
1. I am unclear on how some of the figures were obtained in the powerpoint slides printout provided by Credo. For example, on the slide titled “Apportionment Method – A Comparison” which compares between the 70/30 method (Credo) and the 1/3+1/3+1/3 method offered by CBRE, the values for the latter method are dissimilar to my own calculations. Using CBRE’s apportionment method (which is stated at 1/3 Valuation, 1/3 Strata Area, 1/3 Share Value), these should be:
[Table inserted here has been removed due to its sensitive content.]
Firstly, the values on the powerpoint slides for the 1/3 CBRE method shows deceptively similar values to the 70/30 Credo method. Owners might think that there is not much of a difference between the two methods when for owners of 117sqm units, the difference is substantial at over -$114,405 if we compared CBRE values against Credo values (see pdf file with calculations). I would like to know how Credo derived their 1/3 method apportionment of proceeds, which is quite different from those calculated using CBRE’s apportionment values.
Secondly, using the argument of narrowing the variation between upper and lower bands of premium over valuation is incorrect. In the example of 1/2SA+1/2SV used in the letter dated 12 Sep 2008, a 1% premium increase for a 117sqm unit size amounts to $29,756, whereas a 1% premium increase for a 163sqm unit size is $46,097. In other words, a 2% increase in the smallest unit is almost equivalent to a 1% increase for the largest unit. So, saying that the smallest unit gains 135% premium compared to the largest unit’s 103% premium is deceptive when looking purely at the percentage increases, as it might look to the reader that the smallest units gain proportionately more relative to the biggest units, when that simply isn’t accurate.
The better approach is to look at the apportioned amounts offered by Credo (70/30) and by CBRE (1/3 method) and consider the differences between the two methods. When viewed this way, the 38 units that are 150sqm and above have a positive difference, whereas over 108 units have a negative difference ranging from from -$82,231 to -$114,405. In other words, 108 units will stand to lose the equivalent cost of buying a car if they go with the Credo method. This is untenable and unfair. Given that the argument of using variation is questionable, I would like to see further justification of why the 70/30 method is a ‘fairer’ option for all owners. I would like to see evidence that other estates of similar configuration as BGV have adopted the 70/30 method, or failing that, why this estate is more suited to the 70/30 method over all other methods, without using the variation argument.
Lower Reserve Price Amendments
2. What are the detailed procedures on the dissemination of information on the lower reserve price and the process of the “signing of a supplemental agreement”?
a. This is not clearly defined and stated in the CSA, and needs to be done in as explicit a manner. I fail to see why such procedures are not explicitly described in a legal document such as the CSA when procedural matters are clearly explicated in the Land Titles (Strata) Act’s First to Third Schedules. For example, the LTSA requires that a general meeting be held “to provide information on the number of offers received for the collective sale and the respective amounts” (Third Schedule, 7.1.f, LTSA). By law, therefore, the CSC is required to hold at least one EGM to inform all owners of offers received, and subsequently, if they wish to accept a lower sale price. It is unclear, however, how and when will owners be notified of the opportunity to sign any supplemental agreement. Neither does it provide any information on how long will this process of signing the agreement take.
b. The revised Clause 4.1.4.a where “if the proposed sale price is lower than the Reserve Price, the Seller’s Approval shall be required (by way of signing of a supplemental agreement) before accepting such lower sale price” must be taken to read that not less than 80% share values in the Management Corporation and with not less than 80% of the total strata title area of all Units (excluding area of any accessory lot), ie the “Seller’s Approval”, must sign the supplemental agreement. Is this the case – that should a lower sale price be proposed, the CSC must obtain the signatures of owners that would constitute the Seller’s Approval in the supplemental agreement, before such a sale price can be accepted?
c. If (b) above is correct, then it should be included within the CSA, that the signing of the supplemental agreement must begin at the same EGM to inform owners of the offers received. A deadline must also be stipulated on how long could this collection of signatures for the supplemental agreement take. Otherwise, this supplemental signature collection can in theory last a year from the first signature on it. A reasonable length of time to collect the required Seller’s Approval signatures for a lower sale price, should be not more than 1 month, given that all owners would be aware and the CSC is able to keep everyone informed. This will set owners at ease that there is a reasonable and tangible outcome to this round of collective sale at a lower sale price, whether it is successful or not. Likewise, developers will also be assured that their offer will be taken seriously and not be dragged out for a lengthy period of time while the CSC collects the required signatures. A short and practical deadline will ensure that any change in market circumstances will not affect the proposed lower sale price. Any lengthier period of time will only complicate matters and any argument not to include a deadline needs to be justified to all owners.
3. Does the supplemental agreement required for a lower sale price supercede the signatures on the original CSA, as signed by Sellers? How does this have bearing on the Notice of Rescission fully entitled to Sellers by law which states that all Sellers are only allowed to rescind once from the CSA (also in Clause 6.1.37). So, if a Seller rescind once in the original CSA, signs back on the CSA, finds out the sale price is lower than the RP, can he rescind again? It should be clearly specified in the CSA that in such a situation, the Seller is entitled to his right of rescission.
4. Why is there Clause 4.1.4.b that effectively prevents any owner who previously agreed to the sale (at the expected RP) but decides against accepting a lower sale price, from taking action against any of the Sellers who signed on the supplemental agreement? By law, if a subsidiary proprietor (SP) has not agreed in writing to the sale, he or she may file an objection with the STB. Is a SP who has decided against a lower sale price still entitled to file an objection with the STB? It should certainly be the case, at the very least. I fail to see why such SPs are not entitled to any action against any Sellers who have agreed to the lower sale price, and I would like to know the rationale for this.
5. Again, I fail to see why the clause for lower sale price (4.1.4) is included in the amended CSA by Credo/Rodyk when it was clearly absent in the CBRE CSA. As Mr John Lee’s letter dated 18 October has clearly cited “positive outlook” where the “high-end market (which is where we are) will likewise improve”, and given the recent push again for the collective sale, the CSC must be seen to be confident enough in achieving the reserve price that there should be no need for clauses for a lower sale price. This clause reflects a certain lack of confidence in achieving what is maximally possible for the estate, and an ambivalence in the collective sale. Given its highly problematic nature and the lack of procedural explicitness, I would strongly argue for the complete removal of Clause 4.1.4 from the CSA. This was also the view of others who spoke up at the EGM.
Seller’s Approval
6. Clause 11.2 allows for sellers to “appoint a representative to attend and vote at a Sellers’ meeting and in respect of His Unit, that representative shall attend and vote at the Sellers’ meetings for and on behalf of that Seller”. I note that the second mention of meeting is in the plural. I hope this is a typographical error and would like to point out that the appointment of a representative is valid for only one meeting and not for any subsequent meetings thereafter. This is to prevent any representative from continuing to exercise their voting power beyond the meeting that they are explicitly entitled to do so.
I thank the CSC for allowing me the opportunity to provide further written feedback, although I must admit that most of these are already voiced to the CSC during the 23 August 2008 EGM. I had assumed, given that the EGM was completely audio recorded and minuted, that issues raised then would be addressed in any future revisions to the CSA or apportionment method. I am disappointed that this was not the case. I can only hope that this formal written feedback will make the CSC consider, very seriously, what has been said both at the EGM and now in this letter. Repeating these objections again will only serve to reflect poorly on the CSC’s claims that they seek to be a reasonable and fair group of owners to represent the estate.
Yours sincerely,
Owner
Blk 1 Taman Serasi
Botanic Gardens View
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