Wednesday 20 January 2010

Problems with a Lower Reserve Price

Here's another letter sent to the CSC with regards to the draft revised CSA. Names have been anonymised at the request of the authors.

31 Dec 2009

To the Collective Sale Committee and Credo Real Estate:

Dear Sirs/Madams,

I am writing on behalf of owner of Blk 1 of Botanic Gardens View, who has appointed me as representative on the matter of the collective sale of Botanic Gardens View (BGV).

During the Extra-ordinary General Meeting (EGM) dated 23 August 2008, I and others, have raised a number of critical issues that are seen to be highly problematic both in the collective sale process, and in the Collective Sale Agreement (CSA). Since then, an amended CSA had been sent out to all owners dated 18 October 2009. In the letter from the Mr John Lee, Chairman of the Collective Sale Committee (CSC), it was stated that:

"After deliberations and taking into account the various proposals raised by a few owners at the EGM, the Collective Sale Committee (CSC) agreed with the amendments as proposed by Mr. Norman Ho. A set of the amended pages of the CSA is enclosed for your reference."

I note that the amended CSA included several changes made to Clause 4.1.4 (on the matter of the lower reserve price), with minor changes elsewhere. While this appears to indicate that the CSC may have taken into consideration the “various proposals”, upon closer reading of the amended Clause 4.1.4, I am very disappointed that majority of the issues raised on the 23 August 2008 EGM were not addressed. In fact, my reading of Clause 4.1.4 is that the revision serves to tighten a possible loophole to prevent Sellers who withdraws from the CSA because of the lower sale price from seeking legal action against the CSC and other Sellers.

I wish to reiterate the issues that I raised during the 23 August 2008 EGM, and which is still relevant now, on the following points of the apportionment method and the CSA:

Proposed Apportionment Method

1. I am unclear on how some of the figures were obtained in the powerpoint slides printout provided by Credo. For example, on the slide titled “Apportionment Method – A Comparison” which compares between the 70/30 method (Credo) and the 1/3+1/3+1/3 method offered by CBRE, the values for the latter method are dissimilar to my own calculations. Using CBRE’s apportionment method (which is stated at 1/3 Valuation, 1/3 Strata Area, 1/3 Share Value), these should be:

[Table inserted here has been removed due to its sensitive content.]

Firstly, the values on the powerpoint slides for the 1/3 CBRE method shows deceptively similar values to the 70/30 Credo method. Owners might think that there is not much of a difference between the two methods when for owners of 117sqm units, the difference is substantial at over -$114,405 if we compared CBRE values against Credo values (see pdf file with calculations). I would like to know how Credo derived their 1/3 method apportionment of proceeds, which is quite different from those calculated using CBRE’s apportionment values.
Secondly, using the argument of narrowing the variation between upper and lower bands of premium over valuation is incorrect. In the example of 1/2SA+1/2SV used in the letter dated 12 Sep 2008, a 1% premium increase for a 117sqm unit size amounts to $29,756, whereas a 1% premium increase for a 163sqm unit size is $46,097. In other words, a 2% increase in the smallest unit is almost equivalent to a 1% increase for the largest unit. So, saying that the smallest unit gains 135% premium compared to the largest unit’s 103% premium is deceptive when looking purely at the percentage increases, as it might look to the reader that the smallest units gain proportionately more relative to the biggest units, when that simply isn’t accurate.
The better approach is to look at the apportioned amounts offered by Credo (70/30) and by CBRE (1/3 method) and consider the differences between the two methods. When viewed this way, the 38 units that are 150sqm and above have a positive difference, whereas over 108 units have a negative difference ranging from from -$82,231 to -$114,405. In other words, 108 units will stand to lose the equivalent cost of buying a car if they go with the Credo method. This is untenable and unfair. Given that the argument of using variation is questionable, I would like to see further justification of why the 70/30 method is a ‘fairer’ option for all owners. I would like to see evidence that other estates of similar configuration as BGV have adopted the 70/30 method, or failing that, why this estate is more suited to the 70/30 method over all other methods, without using the variation argument.

Lower Reserve Price Amendments

2. What are the detailed procedures on the dissemination of information on the lower reserve price and the process of the “signing of a supplemental agreement”?
a. This is not clearly defined and stated in the CSA, and needs to be done in as explicit a manner. I fail to see why such procedures are not explicitly described in a legal document such as the CSA when procedural matters are clearly explicated in the Land Titles (Strata) Act’s First to Third Schedules. For example, the LTSA requires that a general meeting be held “to provide information on the number of offers received for the collective sale and the respective amounts” (Third Schedule, 7.1.f, LTSA). By law, therefore, the CSC is required to hold at least one EGM to inform all owners of offers received, and subsequently, if they wish to accept a lower sale price. It is unclear, however, how and when will owners be notified of the opportunity to sign any supplemental agreement. Neither does it provide any information on how long will this process of signing the agreement take.
b. The revised Clause 4.1.4.a where “if the proposed sale price is lower than the Reserve Price, the Seller’s Approval shall be required (by way of signing of a supplemental agreement) before accepting such lower sale price” must be taken to read that not less than 80% share values in the Management Corporation and with not less than 80% of the total strata title area of all Units (excluding area of any accessory lot), ie the “Seller’s Approval”, must sign the supplemental agreement. Is this the case – that should a lower sale price be proposed, the CSC must obtain the signatures of owners that would constitute the Seller’s Approval in the supplemental agreement, before such a sale price can be accepted?
c. If (b) above is correct, then it should be included within the CSA, that the signing of the supplemental agreement must begin at the same EGM to inform owners of the offers received. A deadline must also be stipulated on how long could this collection of signatures for the supplemental agreement take. Otherwise, this supplemental signature collection can in theory last a year from the first signature on it. A reasonable length of time to collect the required Seller’s Approval signatures for a lower sale price, should be not more than 1 month, given that all owners would be aware and the CSC is able to keep everyone informed. This will set owners at ease that there is a reasonable and tangible outcome to this round of collective sale at a lower sale price, whether it is successful or not. Likewise, developers will also be assured that their offer will be taken seriously and not be dragged out for a lengthy period of time while the CSC collects the required signatures. A short and practical deadline will ensure that any change in market circumstances will not affect the proposed lower sale price. Any lengthier period of time will only complicate matters and any argument not to include a deadline needs to be justified to all owners.

3. Does the supplemental agreement required for a lower sale price supercede the signatures on the original CSA, as signed by Sellers? How does this have bearing on the Notice of Rescission fully entitled to Sellers by law which states that all Sellers are only allowed to rescind once from the CSA (also in Clause 6.1.37). So, if a Seller rescind once in the original CSA, signs back on the CSA, finds out the sale price is lower than the RP, can he rescind again? It should be clearly specified in the CSA that in such a situation, the Seller is entitled to his right of rescission.

4. Why is there Clause 4.1.4.b that effectively prevents any owner who previously agreed to the sale (at the expected RP) but decides against accepting a lower sale price, from taking action against any of the Sellers who signed on the supplemental agreement? By law, if a subsidiary proprietor (SP) has not agreed in writing to the sale, he or she may file an objection with the STB. Is a SP who has decided against a lower sale price still entitled to file an objection with the STB? It should certainly be the case, at the very least. I fail to see why such SPs are not entitled to any action against any Sellers who have agreed to the lower sale price, and I would like to know the rationale for this.

5. Again, I fail to see why the clause for lower sale price (4.1.4) is included in the amended CSA by Credo/Rodyk when it was clearly absent in the CBRE CSA. As Mr John Lee’s letter dated 18 October has clearly cited “positive outlook” where the “high-end market (which is where we are) will likewise improve”, and given the recent push again for the collective sale, the CSC must be seen to be confident enough in achieving the reserve price that there should be no need for clauses for a lower sale price. This clause reflects a certain lack of confidence in achieving what is maximally possible for the estate, and an ambivalence in the collective sale. Given its highly problematic nature and the lack of procedural explicitness, I would strongly argue for the complete removal of Clause 4.1.4 from the CSA. This was also the view of others who spoke up at the EGM.

Seller’s Approval

6. Clause 11.2 allows for sellers to “appoint a representative to attend and vote at a Sellers’ meeting and in respect of His Unit, that representative shall attend and vote at the Sellers’ meetings for and on behalf of that Seller”. I note that the second mention of meeting is in the plural. I hope this is a typographical error and would like to point out that the appointment of a representative is valid for only one meeting and not for any subsequent meetings thereafter. This is to prevent any representative from continuing to exercise their voting power beyond the meeting that they are explicitly entitled to do so.

I thank the CSC for allowing me the opportunity to provide further written feedback, although I must admit that most of these are already voiced to the CSC during the 23 August 2008 EGM. I had assumed, given that the EGM was completely audio recorded and minuted, that issues raised then would be addressed in any future revisions to the CSA or apportionment method. I am disappointed that this was not the case. I can only hope that this formal written feedback will make the CSC consider, very seriously, what has been said both at the EGM and now in this letter. Repeating these objections again will only serve to reflect poorly on the CSC’s claims that they seek to be a reasonable and fair group of owners to represent the estate.

Yours sincerely,
Owner
Blk 1 Taman Serasi
Botanic Gardens View

Sunday 10 January 2010

Questions and MORE Questions

Here is a letter by another BGV owner for the CSC with regards to the apportionment method and the CSA. Likewise, this BGV owner is waiting to see if written feedback about the revised draft CSA will be taken into consideration by the CSC...

"Date: 2009/12/31
Subject: MCST 215 (Botanic Gardens View) - Revised Draft Collective Sale Agreement


Dear Sirs,


I refer to your letter dated 18 Oct 2009 and the revised draft Collective Sale Agreement ("CSA") enclosed therewith. In your letter, you asked for written feedback on the revised draft CSA.

I am writing to place on record the following points:


1. Feedback had already been given on the previous draft of the CSA at the Extraordinary General Meeting ("EGM") held on 23 Aug 2008, which lasted for several hours. The feedback given included vigorous opposition to, among other things, the formula for allocation of sale proceeds amongst the subsidiary proprietors, the clause empowering the Collective Sale Committee ("CSC") to enter into a sale below the Reserve Price, the clauses entitling the CSC to amend the CSA and the sale & purchase agreement without obtaining the prior approval of the subsidiary proprietors, and the existence of various clauses indemnifying the CSC and exempting the CSC members from all liability whatsoever. Also, I had requested for the inclusion of provisions to indemnify the subsidiary proprietors and the MCST against damage and liability caused by the actions of the CSC, as well as the provision of a performance bond to ensure performance by the purchaser.


2. Further, it should be noted that at the EGM, the correctness of the figures presented by Credo in support of the proposed formula for allocation of sales proceeds was questioned by subsidiary proprietors. Credo insisted that the figures were correct. However, Credo subsequently issued a letter stating that there were "typographical" mistakes in the figures presented at the EGM, without specifying what those mistakes were and without clearly informing subsidiary proprietors of the effect of the mistakes, which may make a material difference in the perception of subsidiary proprietors (especially those who had attended the EGM and saw the presentation by Credo) as to the decisions which they should make.


3. The feedback given at the EGM has not been taken into account in the revised draft CSA in any substantive or meaningful manner.


4. In particular, from the revised draft of the CSA, the CSC is intent on using the same formula for allocation of sale proceeds as set out in the previous draft of the CSA, notwithstanding that it has not provided satisfactory explanations as to why there was a change from the formula used in the previous en bloc sale attempt (which involved the same chairman and secretary as the current CSC). The formula for allocation of sale proceeds set out in the revised draft CSA is substantially and materially disadvantageous to the subsidiary proprietors of Block 1, and those of them who attended the EGM were totally against adopting this formula. It is grossly unfair to them as they each have one share in the MCST and have, all along, been paying the same maintenance and sinking fund amounts as the subsidiary proprietors in the other blocks.


5. Further, from the revised draft CSA, it also appears that the CSC is preparing in advance for a sale below the Reserve Price. The provisions in relation to such a sale below the Reserve Price do not adequately provide for the protection of subsidiary proprietors who may have signed the CSA on the basis of a sale at or above the Reserve Price. The revised draft CSA does not satisfactorily meet the many concerns raised by subsidiary proprietors at the EGM on this clause, on which the consensus was that it should be removed entirely, in the interests of the subsidiary proprietors as a whole. If such a clause is included in the CSA and potential purchasers are aware of its existence, no doubt they will utilise this to their advantage to reduce the purchase price.


6. Also, I would reiterate my position that the subsidiary proprietors and the MCST must be adequately protected under the CSA from liability and damage caused by actions of the CSC, as well as from non-performance by an intended purchaser. These protections must therefore be incorporated in the CSA, and the clauses indemnifying the CSC and exempting the CSC from liability for their actions must be removed. This is in the interest of all subsidiary proprietors and the MCST, and is absolutely necessary in view of the problems previously faced by subsidiary proprietors in other en bloc sales in Singapore. It is no excuse to say that this has never been done before, as the CSC is duty-bound to protect the interests of all the subsidiary proprietors, rather than adopt a CSA which is more favourable to purchasers in the hope of an easy sale, which may lead to problems for subsidiary proprietors subsequently.


7. It remains to be seen if any written feedback on the revised draft CSA will be taken into consideration by the CSC, after it has ignored the feedback already given at the EGM on the previous draft CSA. However, the CSC members should bear in mind the duties and obligations (including fiduciary duties and obligations) they each owe to all subsidiary proprietors, in the light of the Court of Appeal decision in the Horizon Towers case.


8. The CSA should be therefore be amended to take in the feedback mentioned above, and in due course be considered and decided upon by the subsidiary proprietors in a properly-convened general meeting.
9. Finally, I would also place on record that although the notice of the EGM specifically stated that the items on the agenda for the EGM were to "consider and decide on" the "apportionment of the sales proceeds" and "the terms and conditions of the draft Collective Sale Agreement (inclusive but not limited to the Reserve Price...)", the agenda was changed at the last minute at the commencement of the EGM, when the chairman of the CSA announced that the meeting would only be limited to a presentation and discussion of the draft CSA, and that the EGM would not in fact "decide on" the apportionment of the sales proceeds or the terms and conditions of the draft CSA.

Yours faithfully,

L.H. Tan"


Friday 1 January 2010

Questions, Questions, Questions

Despite having asked the CSC several questions at the last feedback deadline of 30 October, the CSC has only responded to one of my questions by extending the deadline of written feedback with regards to the proposed apportionment method and the CSA from 30 October 2009 to 31 December 2009.

I have decided to email the CSC again with my previous questions as well as new questions with regards to the apportionment method and the CSA. Perhaps the CSC will have more time this time round to respond to all my questions.

For the sake of fairness and transparency, I have reproduced my email to the CSC for all to see.

"RE: Feedback on BGV Enbloc‏
From: BGV Stayer (enbloc_bgv@hotmail.com)
Sent: 31 December 2009 20: 39PM
To:
Cc: enbloc_bgv@hotmail.com

Dear Botanic Gardens View CSC,

I am writing in to place on record the various points as stated below:

1. During the EOGM held on 23 August 2008, the apportionment method of 50/50, removal of the lower reserve price clause, etc., were among the suggestions that surfaced. Although the CSC said they would consider the suggestions given by the owners, most, if not, all of them were not taken up. It would seem that written feedback is the only feedback that the CSC would seriously consider. This was not explicitly stated to owners either at the EOGM or via your previous letters. IT ALSO BECKONS THE QUESTION OF WHAT IS THE POINT OF HOLDING EOGMS IF THE VERBAL FEEDBACK GIVEN THEN ARE NOT SERIOUSLY TAKEN?

2. There seems to be a vote of no confidence in the market situation with the inclusion of the lower reserve price clause in the CSA. If the CSC has no confidence in the market, shouldn’t it be better to wait till the next upturn, rather than to sell BGV at whatever price we can? The lower reserve price clause should be removed to safeguard all owners against the quick sale of BGV. It seems like a case of “die die must sell”. We are NOT in dire strait that we need the money from the enbloc sale.

3. In the revised CSA, there are NO details on HOW the CSC will report the lower reserve price to all the owners.
a) Will ALL owners be informed? Or only the 80% who have signed the CSA will be informed? Or only the owners who are PRO-SALE sellers will be informed as they are likely to sign the supplemental agreement TO ACCEPT THE LOWER SALE PRICE?
b) How will all the owners be notified of the lower reserve price? Through an EOGM? Or through a selective process where only owners who are pro-sale sellers will be informed?

4. In the revised CSA, it seems to be a case where only those who AGREE to the lower reserve price have to sign the supplemental agreement.
a) As indicated in 3b, how can we be assured that the CSC has made every effort to contact each and every owner? What sort of assurance is the CSC giving to us, knowing that in the past, some owners had wilfully been omitted by the CSC from notification about the enbloc news?
b) In the case of owners who have signed the CSA but don't agree to the lower RP, what assurance do we have from the CSC and Credo that these owners would not be badgered and harrassed continuously into signing the supplementary agreement? Can we have assurance in black and white from the CSC and the lawyers that once these owners have indicated they want to withdraw from the CSA, they will be left alone thereafter?

5. There is no timeline stipulated for the informing of owners of the lower RP and no timeline stipulated for the collection of the supplemental agreement. The lawyers and the CSC have refused to set a timeframe in black and white citing it should be the developer’s/ buyer’s call. Therein lies the danger of allowing the CSC to NEGOTIATE with a potential buyer. If the timeline is going to be long drawn-out , e.g. if the CSC made arrangement with the buyer to sell BGV at the lower RP in exchange for 12 months to gather the signatures for the supplemental agreement, there is nothing we could do if the market picks up during the 12 months. That is not looking after the interest of the owners other than making a sure sale at a lower than agreed RP. A time frame of say, 2 months should be fixed by us, the owners so that we can be assured that the CSC is truly looking after our interests, that is, if after 2 months FROM THE FIRST SIGNATURE ON THE SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENT THERE WERE INSUFFICIENT SIGNATURES, the enbloc sale will STOP rather than compromise to a lower reserve price.

6. I have earlier feedback during the 30 October deadline that the CSC and Credo should explain in greater detail why you felt that the 70/30 method is far superior to the other 5 apportionment methods detailed in the Credo presentation (included with the 12 September letter). It remains to be seen if the CSC and Credo would clarify this point or choose to ignore a legitimate query.

7. Also in my earlier feedback, I have asked both the CSC and Credo to clarify on what criteria will you be considering individual owners’ feedbacks? Currently, it would appear that the CSC and Credo is firmly committed to the 70/30 method since it has remained the same despite the EOGM discussions. Likewise, the changes to the CSA appear superficial and is tightened only to protect the CSC further from unhappy owners should a lower RP prevail, rather than in response to the numerous concerns over the lower reserve price matter. In other words, how will you revert to all owners on the feedback received (ie the exact nature of said feedback), your responses to them, why you made the decisions you chose to make, including why you felt that any feedback is unacceptable. Again it remains to be seen if the CSC and Credo will answer a legitimate query or choose to ignore it at their own convenience.

Yours sincerely,
Wong Hwei Ming
Blk 9, #09-17"